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Consider an imaginary research institute where the
i
director has to make ､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ under uncertainty concerning
the institute's research funds which when received, must be
allocated by him between several projects. The project
leaders have supplied him with their utility functions
u l ' u 2 ' ... u n for their own project funding, that is, project
leader k uses utility function uk in matters concerning
funding for his own project.
Now the director decides that, given an amount of
research funding x, he will allocate an amount x k to project
k so as to maXlmlze
+ U (x )
n n
subject to the oonstraint xl + ... + x = x
n
The question considered here, posed to me by Ralph L. Keeney,
1S, what is the implied utility function of the director?
Note that what follows applies also to the case where
the director chooses to maX1m1ze
k u (x )
n n n
for some positive weights k.
1
slnce utility function U.
1
may
be rescaled without loss to k.u ..
1 1
Let
+ U (x )J
n n
s . t . + x = x
n
-2-
Result I It is sufficient to consider the case n = 2 since
a general case may be obtained by repeated application of
the n = 2 case.
Proof.
We require
u (x) = max
x I +x 2 +x 3 = x
but let us consider first the function
v (y) = !'J.ax
Y2+Y3 = Y
It will be sufficieni for the result to show that
But
u( x) = max
xI+Y = x
max
xl +y = x
- max
xl +y 2 +y 3
. II
Hence' until further notice this paper will consider the
problem
u(x) = max
y
( I )
For clarification of notation
,.) Ii· I
f(X = dtf'(t) t=x
-3-
so. for example.
d
-u(y-x)dx
where
= ｾＨｙＭｘＩＨ､ｙＭｬＩ dx
u(y-x) = dU(t)1
dt
t=y-x
H2sult 2 An optimal y exists and 1S unique for (1) if
u and u are strictly concave.1 2
Proof First note that ul(y) + u 2 (x - y) 1S strictly
concave 1n y since u l and u 2 are. and the sum of two
concave functions is concave.
Hence a maximum 15 attained and is un1que.
Define y(x) by the relation
U\X) ::: U (y(x)) + u,,(x - y(x))1. ,:
then result 2 sLows that y(x) is well defined on x.
II
Result 3 If u l and u 2 are twice differentiable and strictly
concave then
I ,
u(x) = ul(y(x)) =
Proof
Let
then
Hence
de
dy
, I
= ul(y) - u 2 (x - y)
de
dy = 0 where
I
til (y) = ( 2 )
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Thid is a maXlmum Slnce 0(y) is strictly concave Ｑ ｾ y.
Equation (2) will always be satisfied if it is assumed that
, I
the ranges of u l and u 2 are equal. For most utility functions
this range 1S - (X) 0), and thus (2) will hold.
Using a Taylor expans10n
, , ,
u(x) + 6x u(x) = ul(y) + 6y ul(y) + u 2 (x-y) + (6x-6y) u 2 (x-y).
( 3 )
and (1) and (2) glve that
I I I
oxu(x) = ll)y(u l (y)) + (ox-6y) u 2 (x-y) =
,
6xul (y) II
Result 4 If the total funding x is increased then each
group rece1ves an increased allocation.
Proof Using a Taylor Expansion for the optimal y = y(x),
so that
u(x + 6x)
( ) ( I: I:) '( ) (5x-Oy)2 u", (x-y)+ u 2 x-y + uX-uy u 2 x-y + 2 2
using (1) and (2) gives
u(x+6x) I ｾ " (6x-6y)2 "= u(x) + 6x u(x) + 2 ul (y) + 2 u 2 (x-y).
( 4 )
Maximizing (4) with respect to 6y implies that
" "oy ul(y) - (ox - cSy) u 2 (x - y) = 0
that J.S
"u 2 (x - y)fJ..x.
= > 0
ox " "u l (y) + u 2 (x - y)
sJ.nce u and u 2 are
strictly concave.
1
Al::;o
" "u l (y) + u 2 (x - y)
> 0
also so that each group receives a strict J.ncrease in
allocation. I I
Theorem ｾ Assuming
(i) u l and u 2 are strictly increasing, strictly concave
with continuous ::;econd derivatives
then
I
(ii) u.(x) -+ 0J.
-+ -00
as
as
J. = 1,2,
() ( I -1 I ) [( 1 + u' -2 1 u' 1 ) -1 ( x )Ju x = u l + u 2 u 2 u l
Proof We have from (2) that
and since
an inverse
or
strictly decreasing and continuous it has
,
which is valid over the range of ul' so that
'-1 '
x - y = u 2 u l (y)
'-1 '
= (1 + u 2 u l ) (y)
Since ｾ > 0 anddx
-6-
ｾ ｳ continuous we have that
'-1 '1 + ｾＲ u, ｾ ｳ strictly increasing and continuous so that it
too has an inverse, hence
'\
(1 + '-1' ,-1 (x)y = u 2 U l )
Since
u(x) = ul(y) + u 2 (x - y)
from ( 5 ) and ( 6 ) we have that
'-1 ,
u(x) = ( u l + u 2 u 2 ul) (y)
( G)
[(1 + ｾ［ｬ ｾｬＩＭｬ (x)]
( 7 )
Note that the formula ｾ ｳ entirely in terms of the known
functions ul and u 2 "
Examples
·11
Take
so the problem is, find u(x) such that
u( x) = ma.xy [log (y + a) + log (x - Y + b)]
By Qifferentiating, setting to to zero we have
1
y + a
1
x - y + b = 0
x - y + b = Y + a
y = x - a + b2
Hence
u(x) log( x - a + b) (x - b + a )= 2 + a + log 2 + b
Now to demonstrate that the same result may be had uS1ng
Thus
1
x + a
1
x + b
Now
'-1 (x) 1 bu 2 = x
'-1 , 1y(x) = (1 + u 2 u 1 ) (x) = x + - u,
u 1 (x)
= 2x + a - b
Hence
= 2 1 (x - a + U + a)og 2
( X + a + b) .= 2 log as requ1red.2
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Hence u l = log(x + a) u 2 = log(x + b) yields a utility
function of log(x + a + b) for the director.
As an exercise for the reader, it may be shown
either ｾ ｹ direct route or via (7) that if
-cx
u (x) = -e
1
and -dx-e
, then
u(x) = -e
-cx
= -eHence
function of -e
cd
- --x
c+d
-dx
= -e
for the director.
yields a utility
In these two standard cases u(x) is the same form as the
functions u l and u 2 •
Indeed if
then
-cx
= -me
cd
- --x
c+d
-e
-dx
= -ne
that lS, the directors weighting of the projects does not
affect his decisions.
Theorem 2
If' each member of the group has
( i ) utility function
-ckx
a -e
( i i ) a utility function log(x
or ( iii ) a utility function -(x +
k = l, ... , n
+ a k ) k = l, ... , n
b )-p P > 0, k = l, ... ,nk
then the group utility function u lS independent of the
weightings given to the individual members utilities.
Proof Since it is merely a matter of solution the proof
will be omitted.
be ampl.ified.
However the statement of the theorem will
( i ) If
+W U
n n
where
then
u(x)
where
-cx
e
f ( ,.) > 0 and
1
c
(ii) If
1
+ ..• +
c
n
then
u(x)
where
a
(iii) If'
= a
1
+ ... +a
n
g(o) > 0
then
u(x) h( ) (x + b)-P= - wl '··· ,wn ' P
nCo) > :)
where b = b l + . .. + b n · 11
The importance of this result lies in the observation
that the group decision maker need only know the group
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members' utilities before making decisions on group funds.
He need not decide beforehand how he will weight the
importance of the group members. In particular the role
of group decisiun maker and weighting decision maker may
be divided between two different people (or groups) who
need not even communicate with each other.
The interestingly simple expression for the exponential
coefficient in Theorem 2 (i) can be generalized.
TheorPlli 3 If r(x) is the coefficient of risk for the group
utility function and rk(x) that for the individual members
then
1 1
r ( x ) = -r-
l
-:-(-x-
l
'7'")
1
+ r (x )
n n
wh.::re x k is the optimal allocation to group member k.
Freof Hecall that r(x)
"
= _u(x)
,
u(x)
Note that this result ｾ ｳ true whatever the forms of the
uk but that this does not imply the proof of a general
form of Theorem 2 because the optimal x k will depend on the
weightings.
For simplicity's sake we ,.ill. ｲ ｾ Ｇ ｇ Ｑ ｬ ｾ it for the case
n = 2.
Now
r
u(x)
,
= u l (y) = (8 )
-11-
Thus, differentiating with respect to x,
"u(x) = ｾｬＨｙＩ £x.dx
From the proof of Result 4
"u,) (x - Y)
.s!.l. := L
dx " "u1(Y) + 11 ') ( X - Y)
,:..
" "
"
U1 (Y) u 2 (x - y)
u(x)=
" "Ul(Y) + u 2 (X - Y)
that lS
1 1 1
-11--
-
"
+
"u(x) u1(Y) u 2 (x - Y)
Using ( 8 ) once more we have that
,
u(x)
- -,,--
u(x)
=
ｷｨｩ｣ｾ gives the result.
trivial using Result 1.
The extension to a general n is
-12-
The following is a characterization (perhaps not complete)
of functions having the property of Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 If all members of the group have a utility
function
then u(x) the group utility function, 1S independent of the
weightings assigned to the group members if
( i ) ＸｶＨｾＩ = v(x + f(8)) -1(where f exists)
or if (ii) v(8x) = v(x) + g(8)
F'rc,o f Note that it 1S sufficient for (i) to ｴ ｡ ｫ ｾ b k = 0
and for (ii) to take a k = 1.
We will ｡ ｬ ｾ ｯ just prove it for the case n = 2.
(i) At optimality
,
D.lGv(uly) =
or using property (i)
'-ISince v exists
a (x - y)2
and
y
D. 2x-f(6)
= a l + a 2
u(x)
·-13-.
vhich is independent of the veighting 8.
(ii) At optimality
I
v(b 2 + x - y)
No .....
I
8v(x) I X= v(-)8 from (ii)
hence
or y
= b,... + x - y
c...
1 + 8
vhich again 1S independent of the veightings. II
Concluding Remarks
-14-
Results have been presented when a
group decision maker allocates resources uS1ng the criterion
of max1m1z1ng total utilities. This criterion has not been
justified, although Theorem 2 suggests to me that it may
well be reasonable and certainly simple to use.
Additivity is not essential for many of the results.
For example if the criterion used is
u (x )
n n
Many of the results are actually simpler because the problem
of weightings does not arise. The results of this paper may
be applied very straightforwardly to the situation
log u(x) = max
xl + .. • + x n = x
